In Commemoration of China’s 15-Year Resistance War

Manchurian Incident
by Ah Xiang

Mukden Incident - 9/18/1931

Japanese militarists had been fomenting calls for war against China throughout 1931. Back in September 1930, Ishihara Kanji designed the scheme for the Kwantung Army to occupy Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in three stages, namely, the occupation of Manchuria and the launch of a pro-Japan puppet regime, the transformation of the puppet regime to an independent country, and the annexation of Manchuria into Japan, which Shigemitsu Mamoru in his recollections termed by "tora no maki", i.e., the wallpaper roll of tiger canvas painting, an ancient military strategic planning terminology that was later used as code for the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack. Further, from April to June, Itagaki Seishiro and Ishiwa Kanji devised the scheme of one-night provocation and occupation of major Manchuria cities, i.e., what Issekikai meant in essence. Ishihara, who transferred to Kwantung Army’s staff headquarters at the recommendation of Komoto Daisaku in late 1928, had played a role in combining two militarist radical organizations of Futaba Kai and Mokuyo Kai into Issekikai (one night society) in May 1929, and further in autumn 1929 expanded on basis of the Japanese-exclusive ronin organization "Manchurian Youth League to form a low-level puppet-inclusive ‘Hornet Society’, with Issekikai officers leading its peripheral organizations. By summer 1931, the hornet society possessed thousands of members, including the Japanese officers, the Japanese militarymen in civilian clothing, the Japanese migrants in Manchuria, and the Chinese puppets.

In June, Japanese spies, Nakamura Shintaro and et al., were caught, and later shot dead. At Wanbaoshan, near Changchun, Koreans forcefully dug a ditch for irrigating their fields. One month later, on July 2nd, the Japanese incited massive ethnic cleansing against Chinese on Korean peninsula in a replay of the atrocities committed against the Chinese in 1927. Chinese newspaper pointed out that it could very well be the signal portending the start of full Japanese invasion against China. (The Japanese, today, still claimed that the Wanbaoshan Incident was rooted in Zhang Xueliang’s "Korean Exclusion Laws", which was a fallacious reading of the new Chinese policies requiring approval at the county and provincial levels for lease of a certain number of acres of land to Koreans in the aftermath of 1930-1931 Korean Communists-instigated Soviet land revolution in Manchuria. In the aftermath of the Korea Communists-instigated May 1930 uprising in Jiandao, Zhang Xueliang and the Chinese people in Manchuria deemed the general population of the Koreans as agents of the Japanese imperialists, and passed restriction laws to require county and provincial approval for lease of land to Korean farmers. The Japanese, to excuse themselves from the conspiracy on Manchuria, falsely claimed that Zhang Xueliang’s new rules were an enactment of the "Korean expulsion ordinance" of February 1931, and had directly triggered the Wanbaoshan Incident.)
On July 12th, Chiang Kai-shek instructed Zhang Xueliang by stating that "this is not a time for war [against Japan]". To quell Shi Yousan rebellion, which was a Japanese scheme to induce the Northeastern Army out of Manchuria, Zhang Xueliang relocated 60,000 more troops to northern China, in addition to 120,000 troops that were steered away on Sept 18th 1930 from Manchuria for the "War of the Central Plains".


The Kwantung Army pulled ahead the provocation to Sept 18th from Sept 28th as a result of the arrival of an investigation emissary from Tokyo. At around 10:20 pm, on Sept 18th 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army blew up railway tracks at Liutiaogou ["Ryujoko", a name devised by Japanese to hint at a ditch or bridge whereas the spot of sabotage was a flat land close to a place named Liutiaohu without the actual 'hu-lake' or 'gou-ditch'] of northern Shenyang City, i.e., the 'Liutiaogou Incident' [i.e., the Mukden Incident], and then accused Chinese troops of sabotage. Liutiaohu Lake was about 800 meters away from Chinese armies of 'Bei-da-ying' [north army camp] in Shenyang city. The Japanese Kwantung Army used the blast as the signal for charge. With 24 centimeter cannons, Japanese bombarded and attacked the 7th Brigade of Chinese armies inside of "north army camp" as well as Dongta Airport. While the 2nd independent garrison Daitai attacks the barracks, the 29th Rentai from the 2nd Shidan attacked Shenyang city. At 50 minutes past midnight, on Sept 18th 1931, three Japanese columns attacked Shenyang city. Back on Sept 16th, the Japanese had obtained advance information that Chinese armies would not resist in any circumstance. Brigade commander Wang Yizhe at the North Barracks reported the Japanese attack to Rong Zhen, chief of staff for the commander’s headquarters of the Northeastern Defense Army. Rong Zhen subsequently made a long distance call to Zhang Xueliang at about 10:30 pm. In Peking, Zhang Xueliang was inviting Miles Lampson to a Peking Opera show at the Kaiming Theater, which was held for donation funds on behalf of the flood victims in northern Liaoning Province, when he received a long distance call from Mukden. Zhang Xueliang gave Rong Zhen the order of non-resistance in regards to the Japanese provocation, and instructed to relay the order to brigade commander Wang Yizhe et al. Zhang Xueliang additionally instructed Rong Zhen to have Japanese military advisers, Senoo and Shibayama, to contact the high command of the Kwantung Army to stop the war, as well as to contact consul-general Hayashi in regards to the Japanese attack. The Northeastern Army’s airforce commander Chen Haihua, under the order of non-resistance, prohibited pilots from taking off at Dongta Airport. Brigade commander Wang Yizhe and Zhu Guangmu, Zhang Xueliang’s secretary, made separate calls to Zhang Xueliang to confirm non-resistance.
The Chinese foreign ministry in Nanjing raised the serious protest with Shigemitsu Mamoru, Japan’s acting minister to China, in regards to the Kwantung Army’s attacks at Mukden and the cities along the major railway lines. On September 19th, Chiang Kai-shek, upon arrival in Hukou from Nanking via riding on Warship Yongsui overnight, changed ship at PoyanghuLake for Nanchang where he learnt of the Mukden Incident from news reports relayed from Shanghai. The Japanese Army attacked Manchuria while Zhang Xueliang was in Peiping, Chiang Kai-shek was riding on the Yangtze for the Jiangxi front and American ambassador to Japan, W Cameron Forbes, was en route of vacation. At night, between 10 and 11 pm, Chiang Kai-shek wired to Zhang Xueliang with instructions to pierce the Japanese pretext as to the railway sabotage as well as a request for constant update on events developing in Manchuria. On the 20th, the KMT-controlled Central Daily carried an account of non-resistance on the part of the Northeastern Army. The newly-arising issue in Manchuria caused Chiang Kai-shek to change plan to return to Nanking from Nanchang by plane in lieu of supervising the encirclement campaign.

The next major Japanese operation would be against the Changchun city where the Japanese had activated its police force, civilian-clothed veterans, Manchuria Youth League members and railway society members. While the 3rd Japanese independent garrison Daitai attacked Yingkou, and the 4th independent garrison Daitai attacked Fenghuangcheng (Fengcheng) and Andong (Dandong), the bulk of the forces of the 3rd Ryodan of the 2nd SquDiv, the 2nd Cavalry Rentai of the 2nd SquDiv, and the 1st independent garrison Daitai attacked Kuanchengzi, Erdaogou and Nanling etc. The Japanese troops at Changchun, other than attacking the district police office at Kuanchengzi and the railway guards at Erdaogou, mounted a siege against the Northeastern Army’s artillery regiment at Nanling. At 5 am, on September 19th, one Japanese Daitai from the 4th infantry Rentai attacked Mu Chunchang’s artillery regiment at Nanling. At Erdaogou, 2nd Battalion commander Fu Guanjun from the 663rd Regiment of the 23rd Brigade, part of the Chinese Eastern Railway guards’ army, resisted the Japanese. At Nanling, Ren Yushan, infantry regiment commander at Nanling, was ordered by acting Jirin provincial chair Xi Qia not to resist the Japanese; however, artillery regiment commander Mu Chunchang rose up against the Japanese. The 2nd Japanese cavalry Rentai of the 2nd SquDiv raced to Changchun from Gongzuling to join the attacks against Mu Chunchang’s artillery regiment at Nanling. Additionally, the Japanese Kwantung Army attacked major cities including Liaoyang, Benxi, Haicheng, Tieling, Siping, Gongzuling and Changchun. By 10 am, on September 19th, the...

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1 Ishihara’s original objective was to reroute troops to Jilin immediately after taking over Mukden while the Japanese troops stationed in Korea were to cross the border as reinforcements to solve the situation of insufficient Japanese troops at Mukden. Honjo initially declined to expand the scope of activities and refused to send the Kwantung Army’s ground troops, i.e., the 2nd Shidan, to Jirin which fell out of the jurisdiction of the Kwantung Army whose tasks were defined as garrison of the Port Arthur, Dairen and the subsidiary areas along the South Manchuria Railway. Under Itagaki’s persuasion, Honjo dispatched the 2nd Shidan to Jirin.
Japanese Army took control of eighteen towns along the Southern Manchurian railway and the Andong-Mukden Railway, including Mukden (Shenyang), Siping, Yingkou, Fenghuangcheng and Andong. The Japanese, after taking over Fushun, Benxi, Anshan, Andong, Fengcheng, Fuxian, Yiping, Haicheng, Yingkou, Liaoyang, Tieling, Kaiyuan, and Changtu, moved the Kwantung Army’s headquarters to Mukden from Port Arthur. In the battles around Changchun, 663rd Regiment commander Fu Guanjun fought on till 11 am and was killed in battle against the Japanese. With reinforcements from the 1st and 2nd garrison Daitai, the Japanese took over the Nanling army barracks by 3 pm. Li Guilin, 23rd Brigade commander and concurrent garrison commander for Jirin-Changchun, abandoned the Changchun city even though he had 700 provincial brigade troops under his command. Tamon’s 2nd SquDiv entered Changchun thereafter.

Chiang Kai-shek’s Central Army withdrew from the 3rd Siege of communists in Jiangxi Province and rerouted towards Manchuria, while communists mounted counter-attacks against Nationalist Government positions. On September 26th, Chiang Kai-shek, upon the news of the League’s change of attitude, swore in his diaries to plan to concentrate the bulk of troops onto the [[Long-hai]] Railway. On October 3rd, Chiang Kai-shek contemplated on making Luoyang or Xian the interim capital. On the 6th, Chiang Kai-shek drafted the statement for the declaration of war against Japan, with a sentence calling on the world powers to bear responsibility for the covenants.

Before the outbreak of the Japanese invasion in September 1931, the Central Army had aborted the Third Siege Campaign in Jiangxi Province to counter the Canton rebels, leaving behind limited number of troops to guard certain key points. With the eruption of war in Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek began to reroute troops towards North China. The communist Red Army, other than ambushing Jiang Dingwen and Cai Tingkai’s armies [which was en route to counter Canton rebels] on basis of deciphered telegrams, mounted counter-attacks against positions of government troops in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian. Taking advantage of the Japanese invasion, the Red Army from the Hubei-Henan-Anhui enclave and the western Hunan-Hubei enclave also racked up military actions. On October 4th, Xu Xiangqian’s Hubei-Henan-Anhui Red Army laid siege of Huangchuan and Shangcheng that were guarded by Zeng Wanzhong’s 12th Division and Chen Yaohan’s 58th Division. The siege continued till the 25th when Lou Jingyue’s 2nd Division came to the relief. On October 8th, Duan Dechang’s western Hunan-Hubei Red Army defeated Zhang Zhenhan’s 41st Division at Yuekou of Hubei Province.

The KMT party held the Fourth National Congress in November of 1931 for uniting various factions, including the faction of Xi-shan [West Hill] Meeting Participants and the faction of 'KMT Re-organizers'. The Fourth National Congress made a decree to empower Chiang Kai-shek with the task of taking the national army to the north to resist the Japanese. While Chiang Kai-shek expressed wish to take the army to North China to fight the Japanese, Hu Han-min insisted on the stepdown by Chiang Kai-shek before returning to the capital. Ever since the
Japanese takeover of Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek, in his diary, wrote every day at the upper right corner the words "avenge the humiliation".

Chiang Kai-shek, in party internal speech, emphasized the necessity of forbearance in face of Japanese invasion by means of "exhibiting justice against hegemony and countering barbarity with peace". Populace, however, increasingly demanded that Chinese government should fight a war with Japan for recovering lost territories. To counter the Japanese invasion, Chiang Kai-shek sought for reconciliation with Canton KMT rebels who forced Chiang Kai-shek into a step-down on Dec 15th 1931. Chiang Kai-shek resigned the posts of Chairman for the National Government, Commander-in-chief of Infantry-Navy-Airforce, and the House Leader for "Xing Zheng Yuan" (i.e., Administrative Agency). Chiang Kai-shek assumed the post of commissioner-in-chief of the KMT Military Committee instead. Chiang Kai-shek did not get back the post of House Leader for "Xing Zheng Yuan" till Dec 1935 and did not assume the post of KMT Chairman ("zong cai", i.e., generalissimo) till 1938.

**Soviet Duplicity**

On September 22\textsuperscript{nd}, Hirota Koki, Japan’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, claimed that the Kwantung Army’s actions were limited to southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. On September 23\textsuperscript{rd}, Lev M Karakhan, Soviet deputy foreign minister informed Mo Dehui that the Soviets would in no circumstances take any steps to make the situation in Manchuria evolve into the more difficult case. On the 23\textsuperscript{rd}, the Japanese imperial general staff headquarters purportedly ordered the Kwantung Army to stop short of moving to the north of Taonan so as to appease the Soviets’ concern. On September 29th, the U.S.S.R., with a notion that completion of the Five-Year Plan was before thoughts of war, declared neutrality on the Mukden Incident. On October 4\textsuperscript{th}, the Soviet Union’s consul in Manzhouli declared that the Soviet Army had no intention to enter Manchuria to guard the Chinese Eastern Railway. In a kind of sync-up with the Japanese who during the 1929 War of the Chinese Eastern Railway “wanted to maintain a position of strict neutrality in the [Sino-Soviet] dispute and did not want to join in international representations” while “on 27 November [1929], the United States tried to rally support for the issue of a joint note of warning to the Russians in the name of the recently concluded Kellog-Briand pact of 1928”,\textsuperscript{2} the Soviets played the neutrality card in the Sino-Japanese conflict over Manchuria.

**The League’s Indifference**

On October 9\textsuperscript{th}, Shi Zhaoji requested with the League to pull ahead its council meeting. On the 10\textsuperscript{th}, Japanese foreign minister, in a declaration responding to the Americans’ concern over the

\textsuperscript{2} Ian Hill Nish, Japanese foreign policy in the interwar period, Published by Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002, p. 72.
October 8th Jinzhou air raid, claimed the act to be a self-defense. The Japanese, other than flying above Tangshan, sent troops ashore at Qinhuangdao. On October 11th, the British put pressure on China in a relay of the Japanese conditions, demanding that China should not insist on the withdrawal of the Japanese Army from Manchuria as precondition for direct talks. The British cunningly demanded with the Chinese that China should avoid conflict with the Japanese prior to October 13th, i.e., the date the League’s council meeting was scheduled to begin. Chiang Kai-shek, in his diary, refuted the British proposal and swore to safeguard China’s land and sovereignty no matter what attitude the other countries or the League possessed. On the 19th, Japanese foreign minister relayed to Jiang Zuobin as well as to the League five principles, with the first clause stating the denial of mutual aggression against each other and the last clause calling for China’s respect for Japan’s treaty rights in Manchuria.

On October 14th, Sir John Pratt, with more sympathy with Japan than China, asked China to give up any plan to use force to recover Manchuria but to find a way for the Japanese to save face in withdrawing troops from Manchuria. The erroneous national policy since 9-18-1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria to have the League of Nations mediate the issue was ascribed to the influence that TV Soong’s Polish counselor, i.e., someone who returned to serve the post-WWII Polish communist government, exerted on TV Soong and Chiang Kai-shek at a distraught moment. The League of the Nations, however, played a game with the United States, saying that they needed the powerful United States to take some leadership role in order to act on sanctions against Japan, while the United States, which authorized its Geneva consul Prentiss B Gilbert to attend the League’s council meetings on September 24th, claimed its role to be merely a non-member observer at the League meetings. The U.S Secretary of State’s October 9th telegram to the consul was to “will endeavor to reinforce what the League does” while in the standby role and hence “avoid any danger of embarrassing the League in the course to which it is now committed.” In light of the disclosure on Hoover’s stance, it could be inferred that it was Stimson who on his own initiative requested for an invitation with the League to send an observer to the council meeting, but as a result of Hoover’s objection to intervention in the Manchurian Incident, Stimson backed off from endorsing the League’s action.

“On its part the American Government acting independently through its diplomatic representatives will endeavor to reinforce what the League does and will make clear that it has a keen interest in the matter and is not oblivious to the obligations which the disputants have assumed to their fellow signatories in the Pact of Paris as well as in the Nine Power Pact should a time arise when it would seem advisable to bring forward those obligations. By this course we avoid any danger of embarrassing the League in the course to which it is now committed.”

The United States, headed by President Hoover, plainly believed that Japan, a counterweight to the Soviet expansion, had a justification not to tolerate a half-Bolshevik China, with his memory and reminiscence staying in the timeframe of 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek collaborated with the Soviets and the communists against the European and American powers.
Battle of Jiangqiao

On September 23rd, Zhang Xueliang ordered the establishment of the temporary offices of the Liaoning provincial government and the Northeast Border Defense Army’s commandant headquarters at Jinzhou. On the 27th, Mi Chunlin was sent to Jinzhou from Peiping as acting provincial chair for the interim Liaoning provincial government in Jinxian County while Zhang Zuoxiang tacked on the post as acting commander-in-chief for the Northeastern Border Defense Army. In order to eliminate the provisional headquarters of the Northeast Border Defense Army and the provincial government, on Oct 5th, Doihara Kenji proposed a bombing of Jinzhou City for testing the response of China, the US and the USSR. Three days later, Kwantung Army commander ordered that two Japanese bomber groups attack Jinzhou. Northeastern Army countered the bombing with field-to-air cannon shooting.

Even though the USSR had declared neutrality on Mukden Incident, Japanese took care to invade Amur Province with Zhang Haipeng’s puppet troops initially. The puppet force, attacking north on Oct 13th, was routed to the south of Jiangqiao Bridge on 16th.

On October 10th, Ma Zhanshan, garrison commander for Heihe and concurrent 3rd infantry brigade commander, was conferred the posts of acting provincial chair for Heilongjiang Province as well as deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast Border Defense Army with the station area in Heilongjiang and general commanding officer for military affairs. Xie Ke, chief of staff for the former Northeast Border Defense Army deputy commander-in-chief’s office in Heilongjiang was appointed the posts of deputy general commanding officer for military affairs and chief of staff of the Northeast Border Defense Army with the station area in Heilongjiang. On the same day, Cheng Yun, former commissar on the Jirin provincial government, was conferred the post of acting provincial chair for Jirin, with interim government office set in Bingxian County.

The Japanese initially sent in with three regiments from Zhang Haipeng’s puppet troops. The puppet force attacked north against Qiqihar on October 13th. On October 13th, acting chair Ma Zhanshan went to Heihe to have a meeting with Soviet Red Army officers. On the 16th, Xu Baozhen’s regiment, which was part of the Heilongjiang frontier garrison troops, under the order of chief of staff Xie Ke, resisted Zhang Haipeng’s puppet invading army to the south of Jiangqiao Bridge on the Nen-jiang River. Heilongjiang frontier garrison troops oined the battle to defeat and frustrate the Japanese army’s plan to use traitors to invade Heilongjiang included Zhang Shusen and Yu Zhaolin’s brigades. On the 18th, Zhang Haipeng’s puppet army, departing Tao’nan, attacked north again. The Heilongjiang frontier garrison troops, in defending the Nenjiang River, blew up the railway bridges of No 1, No 2, and No 5 so as to prevent the Japanese and puppet troops from crossing the river. On October 19th, Ma Zhanshan arrived at Qiqihar to strengthen military deployment and make preparations for the fight against the Japanese, and vowed to resist the Japanese. On the 20th, Ma Zhanshan was sworn in to become chairman and military commander of the Heilongjiang Provincial Government, and delivered a speech to the effect of fighting to the death against the invading enemy.
The Kwantung Army, in the name of repairing the railway and bridges, joined the battle against Ma Zhanshan’s army after Hirota Koki confirmed with the Soviet foreign minister as to Soviets’ strict observance of neutrality. On October 20th, the Japanese decided to attack Qiqihar for testing the Russian response. On October 26th, the 29th Rentai from the Kwantung Army’s 2nd Shidan completed the occupation of major towns along Siping-Tao’an Railway. On October 27th, Hayashi Yoshihide, Japan’s special service board director at Qiqihar, demanded with Ma Zhanshan to get the Nen-jiang railway bridges repaired no later than November 3rd, which Ma Zhanshan rejected as unreasonable demand. On the 28th, Honjo raised a demand to have Zhang Haipeng transfer power to puppet Zhang Haipeng. On October 30th, 1,500 Japanese troops went to Jiangqiao for attacking Qiqihar. On Nov 2nd, Honjo [[??]] issued an ultimatum to Ma Zhanshan after the completion of repair of railway bridges. On this day, Zhang Haipeng’s puppet army took over Tailaižhen town. On November 4th, the Kwantung Army’s Nen-jiang Detachment attacked the Chinese army guarding the north bank of the Nen-jiang River. On the 4th, The Kwantung Army’s Nen-jiang Detachment, consisting of 4000 Japanese and puppet troops and with aircraft and artillery coordination, moved beyond the Nen-jiang (Nonni) Railway Bridge to attack the Daxing train station where Chinese troops constructed new defense positions.

On November 4th, with air support, the Japanese, moving along the Taonan-Ang'angxi Railway, attacked Xu Baozhen’s bodyguard regiment but incurred a casualty of 20 during the first engagement. Japanese planes dropped bombs on Daxing train station. In the afternoon, machinegun fire wounded a Japanese pilot in his leg. The Japanese sent reinforcement to attacking Daxing. On November 5th, at 6 am, 1,500 Japanese troops, pushing Zhang Haipeng’s puppet army to the front, fought against Wu Songshan’s brigade till dawn. Ma Zhanshan reinforced the front with two infantry regiments and dispatched two provincial cavalry brigades to the two flanks of Japanese positions. On the night, the 1st provincial cavalry brigade, in a counter-attack, inflicted heavy casualties onto Japanese. The Chinese army additionally attacked two more Japanese reinforcement columns. On November 7th, Wu Songshan and Zhang Dianjiu’s brigades retook Jiangqiao. On November 8th, the Japanese backed down from the Nen-jiang front.

On November 8th and 11th, Honjo sent two ultimatums to Ma Zhanshan to demand the Chinese army in vacating the Tao’nan-Ang’angxi Railway. On November 12, following an ultimatum to demand Ma Zhanshan to vacate Qiqihar (Longjiang), the Kwantung army, which had decided to concentrate majority of its forces in Manchuria to routing Ma Zhanshan’s army and taking over Qiqihar, sent two RyoBrig and one railway garrison column to attacking Jiangqiao. Over 700 Japanese and puppet troops, under the support of ten planes, mounted a three-prong attack at Sanjianfang. Fan Chonggu, general commander officer, together with brigade commanders Wu Songshan and Zhang Dianjiu, repelled the Japanese attack. Ma Zhanshan personally led defenders in repulsing the attacks. On the 13th, Cheng Zhiyuan’s cavalry brigade joined the
Jiangqiao Battle against the Japanese. Two Japanese attacks at Daxing were repelled. On the 14th, the Japanese launched frontal and flank attacks along the Taolan-Ang’angxi Railway. On the 16th, Japanese tanks and artillery blasted at Daxing and Sanjianfang. On the 17th, with the arrival of a large number of Japanese reinforcements, the Japanese launched several attacks against Sanjianfang but were repelled by Chinese armies. On the 18th, the Japanese attacked Tangchi, Moguxi and Sanjianfang. At 9 am, Tamon’s 2nd SquDiv breached the Chinese first line defense at Sanjianfang. Ma Zhanshan, having exerted his bodyguard column to the battle, ordered abandoning the Jiangqiao front and Ang’angxi as a result of incurring heavy casualties and exhausting ammunition, and consecutively abandoned the provincial capital Qiqihar for a withdrawal to Keshan, Hailun, Baiquan, Ang’angxi and Yushutun. On November 19th, at 10:30 am, the Japanese entered Qiqihar after the 16-day Jiangqiao Battle.

Campaign against Jinzhou

Smitha stated that "a month into the crisis, the Emperor Hirohito was angry over the commander of the Kwantung army, Honjo Shigeru, Honjo Shigeru, declaring his intention to pacify all of Manchuria and Mongolia" Japan's ambition in 1931 was more than the territory of Manchuria and Mongolia. Doihara Kenji planned the "Tianjin Incident" for fetching last Manchu emperor. By mid-November, Japanese controlled northern Manchuria.

On December 13th, Kwantung Army devised the Jinzhou Campaign guidelines with additional troops consisting of 8th Mixed Ryodan, one armored unit, a 15-cm howitzer Daitai, a 10.5-cm cannons Chudai, 20th Shidan headquarters troops, 38th Mixed Ryodan and a heavy bomber squadron. On 18th, Kwantung Army refined the attack plan to make it two-stage campaign.

At the turn of November-December, Zhang Xueliang was dissuaded from withdrawing his troops from Jinzhou. On November 30th, Rong Zhen, in a telegram to Zhang Xueliang, which was intercepted by the Japanese, claimed that he had confidence in Zhang Tingshu's 12th Brigade defending Jinzhou and hoped that the proposal to set up a neutral area in Jinzhou could be rescinded. On December 1st, Zhang Xueliang, in a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, refuted the rumor about the Jinzhou withdrawal. On the 4th, Shi Zhaoji, China’s representative at the League, received instructions as to the Chinese opposition to making Jinzhou a neutral area. The Chinese government claimed that China would defend Jinzhou against the Japanese attack should the League fail to stop the Japanese from moving on Jinzhou. The League’s council abandoned the neutrality plan on December 7th.

On December 15th, the Japanese Kwantung Army, after routing the resistance force in Heilongjiang, began to move troops southward to attack Jinzhou. On December 17th, the Japanese army ministry in Tokyo ordered to deploy the Japanese domestic 8th Mixed Ryodan to Manchuria as reinforcement, and transferred the 20th Shidan headquarters, the 38th Mixed Ryodan, and the heavy bombing squadron to reinforcing the Kwantung Army from Korea. On the 18th, the Kwantung Army refined the Jinzhou attack plan to make it two-stage and three-prong campaign, with combined troops numbering at 40,000. On December 21st, Zhang Xueliang first gave instructions about making preparations for withdrawal from Jinzhou in an
order to his 2nd Army Corps, stating that if the current government’s policy was not clear yet, then the army should not stick to the Jinzhou defense but should withdraw the army to Qian’an, Yongping, Luanhe and Changli at the appropriate time. On the 22nd, Zhang Xueliang wired to Chiang Kai-shek in request for the final pointer on the matter related to the Japanese’s pressing against Jinzhou and the complication in Hebei Province. After Chiang Kai-shek stepped down on the 15th, Wu Jingheng, senior KMT leader, wired to Zhang Xueliang on the 24th to encourage a desperate fight-back at Jinzhou. On December 15th, the Japanese Kwantung Army, after routing the resistance force in Heilongjiang, began to move troops southward to attack Jinzhou. On December 17th, the Japanese army ministry in Tokyo ordered to deploy the Japanese domestic 8th Mixed Ryodan to Manchuria as reinforcement, and transferred the 20th Shidan headquarters, the 38th Mixed Ryodan, and the heavy bombing squadron to reinforcing the Kwantung Army from Korea. On the 18th, the Kwantung Army refined the Jinzhou attack plan to make it two-stage and three-prong campaign, with combined troops numbering at 40,000.

In Tokyo, Inukai, in talks with American ambassador William Cameron Forbes, made an assurance that Japan had no intention to infringe on China’s sovereignty in Manchuria but providing protection for the Japanese nationals residing in Manchuria. On December 28th, the Japanese crossed the Liaohe River to attack Jinzhou. The Japanese 39th Mixed RyоBrig, departing Xinmin and Mukden (Shenyang) on the 30th by train, pushed southwestward along the railway, while the 8th Mixed RyоBrig took control of the railway segment behind. On December 30th, the Japanese 39th Mixed Ryodan attacked Dahushan (hit tiger mountain). On 31st, the Japanese Army reached Goubangzi, and then embarked on the second-stage push towards Jinzhou. Zhang Xueliang, on Dec 29th, ordered that his army at Jinzhou withdraw into the Shanhaiguan. Leaving Jinzhou to the defense by the loyal righteous army 44 trains were arranged for transporting the bulk of army. On 1 Jan 1932, the Japanese Army, after fighting the Chinese irregulars, reached the outskirts of Jinzhou, and on the afternoon of 3rd, the Japanese took over Jinzhou [Chinchow]. The Japanese Army then moved southward along the coast towards the Shanhaiguan Pass at the Great Wall.


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