A Re-compilation of Old Postings
http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?/topic/33559-why-did-china-become-communist/page__st__30
The Chinese Communists (CCP), whom I called by the “men who wear the fine suits” or the emperor without the clothes, often put out some excerpts of the Soviet communication to create confusion that the Soviets were not that helpful, and the CCP had won the war on its own efforts, which was a fallacy as we repeatedly proved. Though, there were technicalities, as already covered by scholar Yang Kuisong, and it was all to do with Stalin’s flip-flops, which Mao had failed to catch up with for the changing speed of the whims. The same happened to the French and American communists when Stalin changed alliances in WWII, such as striking the deals with Hitler. In another word, Stalin always had his own interest in mind, while the Chinese Communists, taking Stalin as step-father, had trouble following orders in time, and for Mao, a rebellious man, hiccups would definitely ensue. Mao, following Stalin’s line, at one time advocated for China to join the Germany-Soviet Union-Italy-Japan alliance, an attempted alliance that Hitler scraped at the last minute for Stalin’s insatiable appetite for the territory carving. Mao, not interested in fighting the Japanese to alleviate the Japanese pressure against the Soviet Far East, sought for another stepfather and welcomed the American Dixie Mission to visit Yenan. At the time when Germany was on the verge of wiping out Stalin and Moscow, Mao wrote off Stalin and had to seek another backer other than the Soviets. Hence The Vladimirov Diaries blasted Mao for writing off Stalin.
The post-Soviet Russia at one time totally opened up the archives for research, and after some years, they found out that it was a mistake, and hence safeguarded their archives again. In their opinion, the Chinese Communists did not appreciate their help, which could be true. The Chinese communists, who moved their archives to the Soviet Union for safekeeping, had brought back the archives in the early 1950s, and hence the secrets of the Chinese communists were not available for the scholars who visited Moscow to discover –something Jung Chang attempted to hint at to make her book substantiated on some Chinese communist archives that could not be found in Moscow. Mao, in the early 1960s, decided unilaterally to repay the Soviet debt while the Soviets never intended to pressure the PRC with debt payment. While Stalin was definitely an evil for China, such as in extracting the economic interests in China’s northern belt, from Turkestan to Mongolia to Manchuria, Kruchschov was a nice guy, and signed off all the privileges that Stalin extracted from China, with a belief that the exploitation in the terms of the 1950 friendship treaty with Mao was un-communist. Otherwise, Stalin’s terms meant the control of China’s Manchuria Eastern Railway and the Port Arthur to the full extent as stipulated, like maybe 99 years, for example. While the Soviets mutated to become the Russian nationalists, a few Soviet communists still exercised an attitude of diligence in sorting through the Sino-Soviet relations, and that include Ledovsky.
Ledosvky
http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?/topic/33559-why-did-china-become-communist/page__view__findpost__p__4989939
“… Ledovsky. This guy is the only person who disclosed the fact that Stalin personally endorsed a Soviet China Aid Act with the amount matching the dollars from the U.S. China Aid Act. …”
http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?/topic/438-the-korean-war/page__st__180
The Soviet-Russians plotted to communize China, from the days of the Russians’ instigating the overseas Chinese students in France in 1919 till the 1940s. There was NO guesswork on the part of the Soviets-CCP in dealing with the Americans-Chiang Kai-shek. Marshall’s reports to Truman and Acheson, using ‘FOR YOUR EYE ONLY’ more than 30 times, went straight to Stalin’s desk. Chinese scholars, like Yang Kuisong and Niu Jun et al., had achieved a breakthrough by emphasizing what the Russians knew, i.e., Ledovsky’s disclosures. Westad, who knew more than Fenbie, Jung Chang and others, also mentioned Ledovsky. Anybody who skipped Ledovsky would never explain the puzzle of the Chinese civil wars. Yang Kuisong and Niu Jung, and others, though, still very much underestimated the Russian (Soviet) control of the U.S. government. They apparently needed to read more into the VENONA scripts.
http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?/topic/438-the-korean-war/page__st__165
Ledovsky said clearly that Mao told Stalin that the order for Lin Biao was to change the Russian and Czheckslovakian weapons into the American Lend-Lease weapons before entering Peiping [Peking].
http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?/topic/1581-mao/page__st__15
According to Ledovsky, the Chinese nationalist government adamantly refused to back down from the 51% ownership in any joint ventures with the Russians (Soviets) in 1945, which resulted in Stalin’s wholesale support for the CCP and the flareup of the civil war. Should you spend time reading the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950, you would know why there was 51-49 dispute in 1945 and why Mao and CCP agreed wholeheartedly to 50-50. And, you wanted to know at what price China sold tungsten, rubber, led, zinc and copper, led, etc., to the Russians to repay the 1.3 billion USD equivalent of loans Stalin gave to Mao in the 1950s. (All the Russian [Soviet] aid before 1950 was on paper “free” and un-reimbursed -whereas the truth was that China’s resources in Manchuria and elsewhere were shipped to the Soviet Union as barter goods.)
http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?/topic/21513-chinese-civil-war-and-tactical-mistake/page__st__30
In Cairo, Chiang talked about his idea for Manchuria with Roosevelt. For years, Chiang relayed letters and messages to Stalin. Stalin never replied on Manchuria. See Ledovsky’s apologies and apologetic writings on the ROC matter.
Looking in the opposite direction, the Russians (Soviets), in February 1948, had offered Liu Shaoqi a no-string-attached loan of 300 million USD loan – which I forgot to mention but just checked Ledovsky’s numbers to have confirmed it – in addition to the free Soviet-supplied weapons from 1945 to 1949.
http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?/topic/33559-why-did-china-become-communist/page__st__30
Yang’s rebuttal. As Yang had countered: “又如刘文花了很多文字来描述东北军工如何没有苏联帮助，“白手起家”，意思大概是想证明说东北解放战争所用的武器弹药多半都是自己生产出来的。刘文所用资料大部来自东北军工部的工作报告，也理当可信。问题是刘统先生是否读懂了报告中所包含的意思，是否有所分析？刘文再三提到大连军工生产的作用，但它却像对待97架日本飞机的问题一样，没有想过大连当时是在谁的控制之下，难道不是苏军在为中共在大连的军工生产提供便利并充当保护伞？[11]”
The Dairen Ordinance was in the extraterritorial control of the Russians, and it was not a Chinese communist proprietorship.
Check
杨奎松：《毛泽东于莫斯科的恩恩怨怨》，江西人民出版社2005年版
关于解放战争中的苏联军事援助问题 覧兼谈治学态度并答刘统先生
for details. For your reference, some excerpts could be seen at
http://club.mil.news.sohu.com/newclub/show.php?forumid=war_pics&threadid=1339409
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:c049OV4JdcAJ:www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php%3F/topic/21513-chinese-civil-war-and-tactical-mistake/+yang+kuisong+north+korea+arms&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com
Note the communist cazr who was sent to North Korea in August 1946 [and returned to Manchuria in Nov 1948] did not go there alone, and even though this guy had the strongest 党性, dǎng xìng, the spirit or character of a political party …, and would take his secrets to the tomb, his assistants would not abide by that, and you still have their memoirs to glean for the truth, namely, the whole North Korea’s arsenals were for free pickp by the Chinese Communists. ( Yang Kuisong’s book 杨奎松：《毛泽东于莫斯科的恩恩怨怨》，江西人民出版社2005年版)
Reference: writing by James Perloff China Betrayed Into Communism on Friday, 24 July 2009 http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/history/world/1464
August Storm lend-lease weapons ended up in Mao’s hands.
“At the Teheran and Yalta wartime conferences, however, Roosevelt asked Stalin if he would break his pact with Japan and enter the Far East war. Stalin agreed, but attached conditions. He demanded that America completely equip his Far Eastern Army for the expedition, with 3,000 tanks, 5,000 planes, plus all the other munitions, food, and fuel required for a 1,250,000-man army. Roosevelt accepted this demand, and 600 shiploads of Lend-Lease material were convoyed to the USSR for the venture. Stalin’s Far Eastern Army swiftly received more than twice the supplies we gave Chiang Kai-shek during four years as our ally.
“General Douglas MacArthur protested after discovering that ships designated to supply his Pacific forces were being diverted to Russia. Major General Courtney Whitney wrote: “One hundred of his transport ships were to be withdrawn immediately, to be used to carry munitions and supplies across the North Pacific to the Soviet forces in Vladivostok…. Later, of course, they were the basis of Soviet military support of North Korea and Red China.”
TEN TRAINS EQUIVALENT AMERICAN LEND-LEASE WEAPONS THAT STALIN & RUSSIANS GAVE TO MAO & CHINESE COMMUNISTS;
FORTY SHIPS EQUIVALENT QUANTITY OF TANKS & CANNONS, BOTH AMERICAN-MADE & JAPAN-MADE
3300 TONS OF PETROL FROM RUSSIANS IN 1947 ALONE; PLUS 2000 TONS OF DIESEL, 1000 TONS OF PLANE FUEL, 700 TONS OF EXPLOSIVES & 2000 TONS OF MACHINERY OIL
30000 TONS OF PETROL FROM RUSSIANS IN 1948; PLUS 1000 TONS OF PLANE FUEL, 5000 TONS OF KEROSINE, 3000 HEAVY WEIGHT TRUCKS & 150 ARTILLERY TRACTORS
DEATH OF MILLIONS OF YELLOW MEN, & POSSIBLY MORE IN THE FUTURE WAR AGAINST TAIWAN !!!!!
I did not really have the final tally, which is far beyond what I listed here. Total shipments to Chinese Communists from North Korea, alone, number at 2000+ train carriages !!!!
Let me give you some citations from Yang Kuisong and Xu Zerong, all widely read, with no state secrets involved. And for the benefits of the general audience, I will attach the English translation.
THE 700,000 RIFLE NUMBER
前苏联公布这些数字距今已经有30年了，海内外众多关心这段历史的读者相信它们也已经30年了。奇怪的是，身为受援方，又不同意这些数字的中国方面，迄今并无任何具体澄清的系统研究，甚至几十年来连一篇有关这个问题的论文都未见发表。既不便开放相关档案，提供人们进行研究对比，也不鼓励相关研究者做深入探讨，弄清史实，结果，在涉及到苏援问题的各种档案文献、回忆资料在国内外以各种方式被逐渐披露出来的今天，笔者试图略做尝试，自然也就会出现像刘文这种全盘否定式的回应。
The former Soviet Union released these figures for 30 years ago. Many readers who were concerned about this history at home and abroad had come to believe in that [i.e., Soviet numbers] for 30 years. The strange thing is, as a recipient, [the Chinese Communists] do not agree to these figures, but so far had taken no systematic research to clarify the issue. Worse, for decades, not even a paper on this issue has been published. Related files are forbidden for comparative study by people; the researchers are not encouraged to conduct relevant in-depth studies for understanding the facts and the results [cause and effect]; in the environment where various archives, and memoirs which in a variety of ways gradually are getting published at home and abroad , [I, i.e., Yang Kuisong] today merely attempted some preliminary study of issues related to the Soviet aid. When I tried to do a little experiment, naturally, you see the negation like the Liu Tong-type response [[liu Tong was from the Chinese Communists’ Military Research Institute under the P.L.A.].
因为前苏联公布的数字，即70万步枪，12000挺机枪，4000余门各种炮及600辆坦克等，按当年中共东北野战军的配备，已足够装备上百万人的部队了。[32]但这并不等于说苏方的数字一定是编造的。
Because the figures released by the former Soviet Union, i.e., 700,000 rifles, 12,000 machine guns, 4,000 artillery pieces and 600 tanks, etc., would have amounted to the quantity that was enough to arm millions of the communist army troops, [people had doubts as to its validity – my addition] [but the Chinese Communist army at the time did not even attain the number of headcounts close to that number of weapons. -my paraphrasing] [32] but this does not mean that the Soviet figure must be fabricated.
但此后自1946年3月初起，苏军态度再度转变，并且十分强硬，坚持中共应该全力阻止国民党进入东北，为此特将沈阳以北地区全部交给中共接收，不向国民政府办交待。中共因此再度得到大量武器装备。只要比较一下刘文所举1945年底与1946年5月这两个时期东北部队的武器装备增长情况，就不难了解在此期间中共得到了多少武器。据刘文称，1945年底中共出关部队的武器数为：步枪39641支，轻机枪1139挺，重机枪105支，掷弹筒59支，迫击炮64门，其他“能够用于战斗的重武器如榴弹炮、坦克、飞机，更是一无所有”。[24]几个月后，部队有长枪160881支，轻机枪4033挺，重机枪749挺，各种炮556门。[25]两相对照，在此前后各部队得步枪超过12万支，得轻重机枪3500余挺，得掷弹筒近千支，并得各种炮492门。而尤其需要了解的是，1946年5月底这一统计数字，是在东北部队几乎全部主力在四平及本溪作战遭受严重失利之后的数字，必须把战争中损失的装备数加上去。而此次作战，仅人员损失就将近20000人[26]，不少部队甚至丧失了战斗力[27]，再加上撤出战斗时极其艰难紧张，北撤时又遭受追击，以致“散的散，叛变的叛变”，逃亡现象十分严重[28]，武器装备的损失自然很大。如果把战争损失的武器，和林彪等战役发生前所报尚未装备部队的库存武器数加上去[29]，1946年初的几个月里中共得到的武器数显然是颇为可观的。
Liu Tong had a comparison of the amount of weapons and equipment at the end of 1945 versus at the end of May 1946.
It is not difficult to figure out how much more weapons, during this period, the Chinese Communist armies had acquired. According to Liu Tong, the CPC troops, when exiting the Sea and Mountain Pass at the end of 1945, possessed the following weapons: rifles 39641, LMG 1139, 105 heavy machine guns, 59 grenade launchers, mortar 64, and almost no heavy weapons such as howitzers, tanks, aircraft, … nothing. “[24] A few months later, the communist army acquired 160,881 rifles, light machine guns 4033, 749 heavy machine guns, a variety of artillery pieces 556. [25]
Under the contrast, various communist units, before and after, had a net gain of more than 120,000 rifles, 3,500 light machine guns, thousands of grenade launchers, and a variety of artillery in the amount of 492 pieces.
And in particular, you need to understand that by the end of May 1946 the statistics were from after the serious [communist army] debacle at the battles of Siping and Benxi, during which time an enormous amount of weapons and equipment were lost when the communist army was defeated in battles. Hence you have to add back the number of lost equipment [to derive the Soviet number of 700,000 rifles, – my addition]. And during this battle [Siping], the personnel loss alone amounted to 200,000 people [26], and the loss of the combat capability of the communist troops [27], when coupled with the loss incurred during the withdrawal …[28], then obviously the loss of weapons and equipment would be naturally high.
THE SHIPMENT to CHINA PROPER
首先，我们应当了解，前苏联档案所讲当年苏军转交的武器数，既包括给东北野战军的，也包括通过东北方面转交给华北、乃至西北等关内部队的，因此不能像刘文那样，只拿东北野战军自身的武器增长情况来判断苏方资料的可信与否。关于此点，《恩怨》一书中其实已有所说明，在此仅具体补充三点资料以引起重视。
What’s disclosed in the Soviet archives from the former Soviet Union as to the number of weapons transferred to the Chinese Communists, would have taken into account the weapons that were both transferred to the Chinese Communists’s Northeast Field Army, as well as the weapons that were transferred to the Chinese Communists’ North China Army (i.e., Nie Rongzhen, Chen Geng, Chen Yi and Liu Bocheng’s communist armies) and Northwestern Army (i.e., Peng Dehuai’s communist armies) in care of the Communists’s Northeast Field Army (i.e., Lin Biao’s communist army). Therefore, you could not merely make a judgment, on basis of the number of weapons that the Communists’s Northeast Field Army possessed alone, as Liu Tong rebutted, to the effect that there was a credibility issue with the archives from the Soviet side.
1945年9月下旬以前出关部队得到过多少武器呢？仅据曾克林回忆，当该部被苏军迎入沈阳后，苏军就已将沈阳兵工厂，及沈阳、抚顺、辽阳、本溪等地的军火库、军需被服仓库等交给了该部，甚至把日本关东军最大的苏家屯仓库也交给了该部。当然，9月下旬苏军态度转变，又将这些仓库大部收回。但该部还是运出步枪20000支，轻重机枪1000挺，和156门各种炮，不仅装备了出关部队，“还将一部武器支援了后续部队和原抗日联军以及关内其他解放区部队”。此后，该部仍陆续利用没有交回的仓库取运武器，包括拉出一批军火于10月前后“发给三五九旅和山东鲁中部队、胶东部队和延安来的教一旅等部队”和“用船向山东龙口送去一批武器、弹药，其中有500万发子弹、炮弹”。[20]
In late September of 1945, before the communist troops exited the Sea and Mountain Pass, how much weapons did they get off? On basis of Zeng Kelin’s recollections alone, when their unit was welcomed into Shenyang [Mukden] by the Soviet Army, the Soviet Army had transferred arsenals in Shenyang, Fushun, Liaoyang, Benxi and other places, in addition to the military clothing warehouses. The Soviets handed over to Zeng Kelin’s communist army the largest of the Japanese Kwantung Army depot in Sujiatun. Of course, the Soviet Army in late September had a change in attitudes, and in turn recalled the control over most of these warehouses. However, Zeng Kelin’s communist army still managed to ship out of the warehouses rifles 20000, 1000 light machine guns, and 156 various artillery pieces, which not only equipped their own unit, but also lent support to the follow-up communist forces, local communist guerrillas, as well as the communist army units in the liberated areas [in China proper]. Since then [i.e., the Soviets’ temporary restraint], Zeng Kelin’s communist army still had retrieved weapons from the warehouses that did not go back to the Soviets, including a number of arms that it in October pulled out of the warehouses for delivery to [Wang Zheng’s] 359th Brigade [in Yenan – should be part of Li Xiannian’s Central Plains communist army in Henan, that got wiped out in early 1947 while attempting a breakout under the KMT-CCP-U.S.A. truce monitoring], the commmunist army in central Shandong and eastern Shandong, the 1st Teaching Brigade from Yan’an and other troops. They shipped over the sea to Longkou of Shandong a batch of weapons, ammunition, of which there were 500 million rounds of ammunition, and artillery shells. “[20]
首先，我们应当了解，前苏联档案所讲当年苏军转交的武器数，既包括给东北野战军的，也包括通过东北方面转交给华北、乃至西北等关内部队的，因此不能像刘文那样，只拿东北野战军自身的武器增长情况来判断苏方资料的可信与否。关于此点，《恩怨》一书中其实已有所说明，在此仅具体补充三点资料以引起重视。一是1945年9月21日中央致重庆代表团电曾谈到晋察冀军区聂荣臻部来电，内称：苏蒙军本月底将从察哈尔撤完，军用品一部交我，并愿今后助我。[16]实际上，这时来自晋察冀和晋绥军区的这种电报还有不少，大都谈到与苏军合作及获取武器帮助的问题。
First, on September 21, 1945, the CCP Central [in Yenan] reported to the Chongqing delegation [i.e., Mao Tse-tung], stating that Nie Rongzhen’s Jin-Cha-Ji District had telegrams stating that the Soviet-Mongol Armies, before pulling out of Chahar [[and of course Jehol – my addition]] that was scheduled for the end of the month, had transferred and would transfer some military goods to me [i.e., the communists], and promised to provide assistance to me [i.e., the communists] in the future. In fact, there were quite some telegrams from Nie Rongzhen’s Jin-Cha-Ji District and the Shanxi-Suiyuan communists to the effect that they had acquired weapons from the Soviet Army. [16]
二是曾克林回忆提到，9月及10月，他所在部队曾不止一次地将他们在沈阳、锦州等地接收的大批武器弹药，转运给了关内的部队和山东的部队。[17]
Second, Zeng Kelin recalled that in September and October, his [communist] unit had more than once shipped massive amount of weapons and ammunition, from Shenyang and Jinzhou [in Manchuria], to the communist brotherly forces within the Sea and Mountain Pass and the communist forces of Shandong [i.e., Chen Yi and Su Yu’s communist army]. [17]
三是1946年5月20日东北局曾致电中央，说明苏军坚决支持东北野战军死守四平，并已经指示驻朝苏军立即提供弹药应急，并劝中共在关内另辟战场以减轻东北压力，为此希望中共能够组织海上运输，从东北向山东运送武器弹药，说要多少给多少。随后驻朝苏军即向中共东北野战军提供了第一批武器弹药。5月28日，第一批82挺轻机枪，32挺重机枪，43万发子弹和一万箱炸药及大量电器材料等即由海路运往山东。至6月下旬初即已运送三批。以后运送则更为频繁，数量也更大。到8月间，步枪已达数万支，机枪达上千挺，最多一次朝鲜苏军即提供了上百车皮武器弹药。对此，刘统先生并非完全不了解，但却断言这些事情只发生在1946年底1947年初中共部队最困难的一个短暂时期，并且坚持说苏联和朝鲜的态度大相径庭，苏联不仅两度拒绝帮助，后来同意也是要求以粮食作为交换，而朝鲜方面却“无偿赠与和无代价帮助我们装运”。然而已有的资料却显示，至少在1946年，苏方提出希望能够得到粮食已经是10月下旬的事情了，此前除了中方发现苏军好饮酒故建议山东军区找些白兰地过来以联络感情之外，并未见任何以货易货的问题提出。
Third, on May 20, 1946, the CCP Northeast Nureau reported to the CCP Central that the Soviet Russian Army firmly supported the communist Northeast Field Army to make a stand at Siping, for a duel, and they had directed the Soviet Army in [North] Korea to render the immediate emergency shipment of ammunition [to the Chinese Communist armies], and further suggested that the Chinese Communists, for taking off the pressure of the government troops’ assault [on Siping and] within the Northeast, [proactively – I added] launch the battlefields within the China proper, organize the maritime transport for the delivery of weapons and ammunition to the Shandong peninsula from the northeast. The Soviets claimed that no matter how much weapons and ammunition the Chinese Communists demand, they would be satisfied. Immediately afterwards, the Soviet Army in Communist North Korea provided the first batch of weapons and ammunition to the communist North China Field Army. On May 28, the first batch of 82 light machine guns, 32 heavy machine guns, 43 million rounds of ammunition and one million boxes of explosives and a large number of electrical materials, were shipped to Shandong over the sea. Already in early June to late in the month, there were three deliveries. Afterwards, the delivery became more frequent, the numbers even greater. By August, the rifles had reached tens of thousands, up to thousands of machine guns, and at the height [till August 1946], the Soviet Army in North Korea provided hundreds of train carriages of weapons and ammunition.
ARSENALS
又如刘文花了很多文字来描述东北军工如何没有苏联帮助，“白手起家”，意思大概是想证明说东北解放战争所用的武器弹药多半都是自己生产出来的。刘文所用资料大部来自东北军工部的工作报告，也理当可信。问题是刘统先生是否读懂了报告中所包含的意思，是否有所分析？刘文再三提到大连军工生产的作用，但它却像对待97架日本飞机的问题一样，没有想过大连当时是在谁的控制之下，难道不是苏军在为中共在大连的军工生产提供便利并充当保护伞？[11]而且，如果刘统先生对历史能够有所联想，有足够的经验，他更应当想到，假如东北的军工生产真是像他描写的那样，很少机器，只是招几个当地工人，利用几个日本技术人员，赤手空拳一年多就能造子弹数千万、炮弹数百万，那么抗战八年，延安等根据地也用了不少日本技术人员，也搞了一些机器，八路军为什么连黄色炸药都生产不出来，还只能靠游击战对付日本人？事情很清楚，东北的军工生产从制造大批子弹、炮弹直至钢材和冲压设备，没有哪一样不是借助于日本留下来的兵工、化工和钢铁工厂的基础。这些工业设备，又都是在苏军的控制之下，必须要由苏军提供便利才能取得，怎么能说东北军工生产完全是“白手起家”，与苏援无关呢？
Another example is that Liu Tong spent a lot of words to describe how the Northeast [Communist Army] had received no Soviet military help, starting “from scratch”, which was meant to prove that the Northeast [Communist Army], in the liberation war, had consumed weapons and ammunition that were mostly produced on its own. Liu Tong used data from the work report of the military arsenal department of the Northeast [Communist Army], which should be trusted. The question is whether Mr. Liu Tong had actually read and understood the meaning contained in the report, whether it was analyzed? Liu Tong repeated the reference to the role of military production at Dalian, like treating the 97 Japanese planes in question. Was there any thought as to who was in control of Dalian, was it not for the Soviet military that the Chinese Communists were facilitated in the production of military arsenals at Dalian which acted as a protective umbrella? [11] Moreover, if Mr. Liu Tong knew about history, had enough experience, he should recall that if the production was really that easy as the northeast military department did as he described it, a few machines, just getting a few local workers, employing some Japanese technicians, then [the northeast military department] single-handedly more than a year could make tens of millions of bullets, shells by millions. Then, during the resistance war for eight years, the Yan’an base also used a lot of Japanese technicians, possessing some machines, why the Eighth Route Army never even succeeded in making the TNT out of production, and they had to rely on the guerrilla warfare against the Japanese [for obtaining supplies]? It is clear that the northeast military production, from manufacturing of a large number of bullets, to artillery shells to the steel and stamping equipment, all of them were built on the basis of what Japan left behind, i.e., the leftover ordinance, chemical and steel plants. Furthermore, this industrial equipment, under the control of the Soviet Army, must be facilitated by the Soviet Army in order [for the Chinese Communists] to obtain. How can you say the northeast military production was completely undertaken “from scratch”, having nothing to do with the Soviet assistance?
刘统先生哪怕稍微细心一点，就更应该能够从军工部的报告当中看到，东北军区后勤部军事工业部之建立，主要目的就是负责从苏军手里接收沈阳及南满地区的工业企业，特别是兵工厂。[12]而军工部成立伊始，就接连从苏军手里接收了沈阳地区大东区兵工总厂、文官屯坦克修理厂和孤家子火药厂等多家重要的兵工厂。只是由于后来苏军受到国民党的外交压力，要求中共所有单位撤出沈阳，这些工厂才又交回到苏军手中，但苏军还是允许中共东北军工部拉走了30多部机器和200多吨物资。同样的情况，苏军也先后将抚顺、本溪、辑安、鞍山、辽阳、延边等地及其兵工厂、化学工厂交予中共接收，中共撤出时更运出了数百台机器和上千吨各种原料。中共1946年6月向北满撤退时，仅各种军工机器和原料就运了300多车皮。[13]中共后来能在哈尔滨、齐齐哈尔、佳木斯、鸡西等地建立军工生产基地，能够大批生产并及时供应战争所需的大量弹药，也都与苏军提供便利甚至是提供帮助有关。讲东北解放战争，怎么能完全不考虑这一极大不同于延安时期的特殊背景呢？对于这一点，刘统先生只要在分析他所看到的史料时，稍加推敲，就应当可以想到。
The Northeast Military Region’s Logistics Department and the military industry department were established with the main purpose and responsibility lying in receiving, from the hands of the Soviets, the South Manchuria industrial enterprises, as well as Shenyang’s industrial enterprises, especially arsenals. [12] The Military Industry Department, when established at the very beginning, received from the Soviet hands the arsenals such as Dadongqu Ordnance Factory in Shenyang, the Wenguantun tank repair and the Gujiazi fire powder factory and a number of important arsenals. When the KMT exerted pressure on the Soviet army via diplomacy, the Soviet army requested that all CPC units in Shenyang vacate the city, those factories went back into the hands of the Soviets, but the Soviet military still allowed the Chinese communists’ Northeast Military Department carry away more than 30 machines and 200 tons of materials. Similarly, the Soviet Army in Fushun, Benxi, Ji’an, Anshan, Liaoyang, Yanbian and other places transferred arsenals, chemical plants to the CPC. When the CPC was withdrawing to North Manchuria, they hauled hundreds of machines and thousands of tons of various raw materials. The CPC in June 1946 northern full retreat, transported more than 300 train carriages of a variety of military machines and raw materials. [13] The CPC later in Harbin, Qiqihar, Jiamusi, Jixi and other places, established the military production bases, beginning the mass production and timely supply of the required large quantities of ammunition of war, all to do with with Soviet help and facilitating.
Communist leader Li Fuchun’s activities.
李富春任东北军区兼东北野战军副政治委员。他正在筹划东北战场战略决战的军事物资。仅1947年9月至1948年7月不到一年的时间里，东北解放军的新兵就增加了20倍，部队的急速壮大对后勤保障不断提出新的要求；转入战略决战要打大仗，打阵地攻坚战，要夺取敌人坚固设防的大城市，需要大炮、炮弹这些重型武器军火。李富春到朝鲜是为寻求解决这些问题的办法，同时，他还肩负一个任务，即代表党中央，迎接响应中国共产党“五一”号召、从香港出发借道朝鲜到解放区准备参加新政治协商会议的著名民主人士。
Northeast Military Region deputy political commissar Li Fuchun, who was concurrent deputy political commissar of the Northeast Field Army, was the planner for strategic battles in the northeast battlefield and the military supplies. Only from September 1947 to July 1948, less than a year, the Northeast People’s Liberation Army recruits had increased by 20 times, the rapid growth of military logistics making new demands. For sake of launching the strategic battle, fighting major battles, playing position battles, and to seize the enemy strong fortified cities, there was the need for heavy artillery pieces, shells of these heavy weapons ammunition. Li Fuchun went to North Korea for seeking to address these problems; at the same time, he was also responsible for a task, that is, the CPC Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in arranging the Hongkong-Manchuria trip of well-known Democratic people who responded to the “May Day” call, was to open up a route [[i.e., expanding the Ho Chi-ming Trail to an international transportation hub- my addition]] through North Korea to the liberated areas in preparing for the convention of the new Political Consultative Conference .
Now, 徐澤榮Xu Zerong’s thesis, which was originally published at Princeton University, “Contemporary China Studies,” 2000 No. 2 .
在井岡山時代，中共曾先後八次發動以奪取上述港口為目標的戰役或戰鬥（包括三打潮梅），不過均告失敗。江西根據地失陷後，紅軍在長征中轉向綏遠、寧夏、甘肅地區，也與靠近外蒙、接受蘇援槍械有關。西安事變前，中共與張學良所簽密約的核心就是中共同意分撥蘇援餉械給東北軍。西安事變後，蘇聯
竭力撮合國共兩黨再度合作，並同意供給國民黨30個師的重武器和局部空中保護，但交換條件是國民黨必須供給共產黨每月60萬元的軍餉（前後共發了三年）。在1937年至1940年期間，莫斯科可能通過外蒙和新疆為中共秘密運送了數萬支( 非蘇造) 槍械。蘇聯紅軍於1945、1947年又兩次將日本關東軍的70萬支槍械( 其中20萬支來自駐朝日軍) 交給了中共。據原抗聯領導人彭施魯回憶，蘇聯還曾將在歐洲繳獲的部分德造武器和捷克造武器交給中共。這些來自歐洲的槍械可能是通過北朝鮮轉運的，據記載，北朝鮮曾將2,000 車皮的”日軍遺留”戰略物資交給中共。從1942年至1949年，美國通過大規模美援、為國民黨一共才武裝了45個步兵師，而從1945到1948年之間，中共主要依靠蘇援槍械卻組建了210 個步兵師。
The Soviet Red Army in 1945,1947 and twice the Japanese Kwantung Army’s 700,000 firearms (including 200,000 from the Japanese arsenals in North Korea ) to the CCP. According to Peng ShiLu , the Soviet Union had also seized in the European theater the German-made weapons and the Czech-made weapons for transfer to the CPC. These arms from Europe were transfered to the Chinese Communists through North Korea.
http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?/topic/33559-why-did-china-become-communist/page__st__30
Su Yu’s memoirs.
Su Yu pointed out:
“我们除了没有飞机外，一切都有，我们的炮兵和坦克比敌人多。在全歼杜聿明集团时，我军炮火便完全压倒敌人。”
“我们打杜聿明，几乎用炮火推平村庄，一个村子打几千颗炮弹和成千成万斤炸药。”
“华东战场，特别是淮海战役的胜利，离不开山东人民的小推车和大连生产炮弹。”
参考文献：罗平汉著《党史细节》
Basically, Su Yu said his army wiped out villages by villages through the blanket shelling, thanks to the supply of shells from the Soviet-controlled arsenal at Dairen. Su Yu claimed that they had more tanks and artillery than the government troops did. Where the tanks and artillery from? See the Soviet disclosure at http://www.kanzhongguo.com/node/403881 Yang Kuisong was the only guy who described about the supply of weapons from North Korea. Conveniently omitted here was a communist czar sent to Pyongyang for overseeing the military shipments, because this guy was at one time the culprit who killed 200 Red Army officers under Liu Zhidan’s Shenxi Red Army in October 1935 and was considered not that ‘glorious’ – nevertheless he was invited to Mao’s marriage banquet at a Yenan trading house while party secretary Zhang Wentian was not invited for the objection to Mao’s “marriage” to Jiang Qing. (I talked about him at http://www.chinahistoryforum.com/index.php?/topic/798-long-march/page__st__15 )
CHINA BETRAYED INTO COMMUNISM
In Oct 1944, British Prime Minister Churchill visited the U.S.S.R., and on Oct 16th, mentioned that they expected that the war against Japan might end by the end of 1947. The second day, Stalin promised to declare war on Japan within 3 months of Germany’s defeat. Stalin proposed to the U.S. a list of supplies for 60 divisions of the Russian Red Army, i.e., an extra 1 million tons of supplies in addition to the items covered under the Lend Lease Act, including 120,000 tons of plane fuel, 70,000 tons of truck fuel, 30,000 trucks, 1500 jeeps, 500 C47 & C54 transporters, 30 cruisers, 50 submarines, 500 locomotives, 5-6000 carriages, and 800 kilometer long railway tracks. This American supply of the August Storm weapons and ammunition would be turned over by Stalin to the Chinese communists in the civil war that overthrew the rule of the Republic of China.
FORTY SHIPS EQUIVALENT QUANTITY OF TANKS & CANNONS, BOTH AMERICAN-MADE & JAPAN-MADE
3300 TONS OF PETROL FROM RUSSIANS IN 1947 ALONE; PLUS 2000 TONS OF DIESEL, 1000 TONS OF PLANE FUEL, 700 TONS OF EXPLOSIVES & 2000 TONS OF MACHINERY OIL
30000 TONS OF PETROL FROM RUSSIANS IN 1948; PLUS 1000 TONS OF PLANE FUEL, 5000 TONS OF KEROSINE, 3000 HEAVY WEIGHT TRUCKS & 150 ARTILLERY TRACTORS
DEATH OF MILLIONS OF YELLOW MEN, & POSSIBLY MORE IN THE FUTURE WAR AGAINST TAIWAN !!!!!
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(Reference: see the writing by James Perloff China Betrayed Into Communism at
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/history/world/1464
August Storm lend-lease weapons ended up in Mao’s hands
“At the Teheran and Yalta wartime conferences, however, Roosevelt asked Stalin if he would break his pact with Japan and enter the Far East war. Stalin agreed, but attached conditions. He demanded that America completely equip his Far Eastern Army for the expedition, with 3,000 tanks, 5,000 planes, plus all the other munitions, food, and fuel required for a 1,250,000-man army. Roosevelt accepted this demand, and 600 shiploads of Lend-Lease material were convoyed to the USSR for the venture. Stalin’s Far Eastern Army swiftly received more than twice the supplies we gave Chiang Kai-shek during four years as our ally.
“General Douglas MacArthur protested after discovering that ships designated to supply his Pacific forces were being diverted to Russia. Major General Courtney Whitney wrote: ‘One hundred of his transport ships were to be withdrawn immediately, to be used to carry munitions and supplies across the North Pacific to the Soviet forces in Vladivostok…. Later, of course, they were the basis of Soviet military support of North Korea and Red China.’)